Never Vote for a Lawyer: An Economic Argument Based on the Historical Evolution of Society

Date: November 13, 2024

Throughout history, the prosperity of nations has hinged not only on their natural resources or geographic luck, but on the quality and adaptability of their institutions. In the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal and Spain offer a cautionary tale: despite their once-vast empires and early global influence, both countries have struggled to keep pace with the economic dynamism of Northern Europe. A key factor in this stagnation lies in the inefficiency and rigidity of their legal and court systems—a legacy that continues to shape their societies today.

The court systems in Portugal and Spain are notorious for their slow pace, bureaucratic complexity, and susceptibility to procedural entanglements. Legal disputes can drag on for years, sapping resources and discouraging both domestic and foreign investment. This inefficiency is not merely a technical problem; it is a symptom of deeper institutional inertia, where the legal profession—lawyers, judges, and the broader legal apparatus—often acts as a gatekeeper, prioritizing the preservation of established procedures over the pursuit of innovation and economic vitality.

In contrast, societies that have thrived—measured by metrics such as GDP per capita—are those that have fostered environments where innovation is rewarded and institutional frameworks are flexible enough to adapt to new challenges. The United States, the United Kingdom, and several Northern European countries have repeatedly reformed their legal and economic systems to reduce friction, encourage entrepreneurship, and resolve disputes efficiently. These reforms have not only accelerated economic growth but have also promoted a culture where creative problem-solving is valued over procedural mastery.

The economic argument against electing lawyers to positions of political power is rooted in this historical context. Lawyers are trained to navigate, defend, and often perpetuate existing legal structures. While legal expertise is essential for the functioning of any society, an overrepresentation of lawyers in government can lead to a bias toward maintaining the status quo, rather than pursuing bold reforms. This is particularly problematic in countries where the legal system itself is a bottleneck to progress.

The evolution of societies can be understood through the lens of institutional Darwinism: just as species adapt or perish, so too do institutions. Those that fail to evolve in response to changing economic and technological realities risk obsolescence. The lesson from history is clear—societies that prioritize innovation, efficiency, and adaptability in their institutions outperform those mired in legalistic inertia. For voters, this means recognizing the importance of diverse backgrounds in political leadership, and being wary of entrusting the future to those whose primary allegiance is to the preservation of the legal order rather than its continual improvement.